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Trezor Safe 5 Implant Found in Three Wallets Sold by CryptoBilis; Firmware Fix Released

Trezor says three Trezor Safe 5 wallets bought from former reseller CryptoBilis between August 20 and September 23, 2026 contained a hidden board that copies recovery words off the screen. Firmware 2.13.1 blocks the known implant and no losses have been reported, but CryptoBilis buyers are still told to move funds to a new wallet with a new seed.

MyTraderBot DeskPublished: 11 min readخواندن به فارسی
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Hand holding a Trezor Safe 7 hardware wallet showing a Bitcoin transaction to confirm
Photo: FlippyFlink / Wikimedia Commons · CC0 (archive image of a different model)
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Trezor says it has found hidden hardware implants in three Trezor Safe 5 hardware wallets sold by CryptoBilis, a former authorized reseller in Southeast Asia. In an update on its official blog dated Thursday, November 12, 2026, the Czech wallet maker said the Trezor Safe 5 implant is an extra circuit board that copies recovery words from the device's screen and sends them to the attackers over a mobile network. Trezor also said that firmware 2.13.1, released on November 11, stops the implants it has found from capturing anything, and that it has cut its reseller network by about 80%.

No customer has reported losing funds, according to Trezor. But the company's advice to CryptoBilis buyers has not changed: move your funds to a new wallet with a new seed. A firmware update cannot protect a wallet backup that may already have been captured.

What Trezor found

The November 12 post, titled "Our CryptoBilis investigation: what we found and what we've changed", is a follow-up to a first warning Trezor published on October 30. Trezor shared the update on its official @Trezor account on X at about 14:03 UTC on November 12 (17:33 Tehran time).

The key findings, as stated by Trezor:

  • Three confirmed devices. Three Trezor Safe 5 units bought from CryptoBilis contain the implant, including the one first reported in October. Trezor's lab examined that first device. The other two were identified from photos of the internals sent by their owners.

  • A narrow purchase window. All three were bought between August 20 and September 23, 2026, through CryptoBilis's stores on the Tokopedia and Shopee marketplaces and directly from CryptoBilis.

  • 48 buyers checked so far. After the October reports, Trezor asked CryptoBilis customers to contact it. Forty-eight have done so, and Trezor is checking their devices in its lab or from photos. Every other device checked showed no sign of tampering.

  • No other channels or models. Trezor says it has found no implants in devices from any other reseller, or in any Trezor model other than the Safe 5. It also checked devices from its other resellers in the region and found no evidence of tampering.

  • No reported losses. None of the three owners has lost funds, and no customer has reported a loss.

How the Trezor Safe 5 implant works

Trezor's embedded team extracted and analyzed the firmware from the implant in the first reported device. According to Trezor's description:

  • The implant is an extra circuit board fitted between the Safe 5's main board and its screen.

  • It only listens. It copies what is shown on the screen, including what the user types on the device, and never changes the device itself, including its firmware and Secure Element.

  • When recovery words appear on the screen, it recognizes and stores them. That covers both the words shown when a new wallet backup is created and the words typed in when an existing wallet is recovered onto the device. It does the same with a passphrase if one appears on the screen.

  • It encrypts what it captures and sends it over the mobile network to a server controlled by the attackers. If it cannot connect, it keeps the data and keeps trying until it succeeds.

Trezor says the implant "works the same way as the implants found in Ledger devices, adapted to the Trezor Safe 5's display." The October 30 notice, based on the reporter's description, said the board carried a cellular module and an antenna.

Because the implant leaves the firmware and Secure Element untouched, the device can appear to work normally. This is what makes this kind of attack hard to notice: the secure chip is never attacked, and the secret is simply read off the screen when the user is shown it.

What firmware 2.13.1 changes

Trezor's official firmware changelog lists version 2.13.1 with a release date of 11 November 2026 for the Trezor Safe 7, Safe 5, Safe 3 and Model T. The public release notes on GitHub do not list the implant protection as a separate item, and Trezor says it will not publish technical details that could help attackers.

A Trezor spokesperson gave Protos a short explanation. "The implant listens to the communication between the MCU and the display and triggers the capture when it sees a specific sequence," the spokesperson said. Trezor told Protos it "changed the order of the commands sent to the display," and that this works "without any effect on the displayed screen."

In other words, the fix targets the trigger the known implant relies on. Trezor's own wording is careful: the protection stops "the implants we've found" on "devices that run it", making "the current batch" useless. It does not claim that a future, redesigned implant could not get around it, and it does not undo anything captured before the update.

Who is affected

The confirmed cases are limited to Trezor Safe 5 devices bought from CryptoBilis between August and September 2026. Trezor's guidance is wider than that, however. Its October 30 notice says the advice applies to every Trezor model bought from CryptoBilis from March 2026 onwards, and to any store selling devices supplied by CryptoBilis, including its Tokopedia store. If you are not sure where your device came from, Trezor suggests checking the seller name on your receipt or contacting Trezor Support.

CryptoBilis sold hardware wallets in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, according to CoinDesk and Cointelegraph. Trezor says it removed CryptoBilis from its authorized resellers on October 9, 2026.

What CryptoBilis buyers should do, step by step

Based on Trezor's October 30 and November 12 guidance:

  1. If you already use the device, move your funds to a new wallet with a new seed as soon as possible. Do not simply restore your existing recovery phrase on another device. Trezor says using the backup created on the tampered wallet on a different device "does not solve the issue."

  2. If you have no other secure hardware wallet, Trezor suggests moving funds temporarily to a software wallet or an exchange you are familiar with. Check the full receiving address carefully before sending anything.

  3. If the device is still unused, do not set it up, and never type an existing wallet backup into it.

  4. Update to firmware 2.13.1. This blocks the known implant on devices that run it, but it does not replace step 1.

  5. Keep the CryptoBilis device and contact Trezor Support at trezor.io/support to arrange a replacement. Customers who bought a Trezor from CryptoBilis from March 2026 onwards are eligible for a new device. Where shipping rules prevent delivery of a model, Trezor may offer a different model and refund the price difference, delivery to an address in another country, or a refund.

  6. Watch out for scams. Trezor says scammers are using the incident in phishing attacks, including fake emails, physical letters and phone calls. Trezor will never ask for your recovery phrase, and it says to deal with it only through its official support site.

For a refresher on keeping a recovery phrase safe once you have created a new one, see our seed phrase guide.

The Ledger precedent

Trezor's case follows a larger incident involving Ledger devices sold through the same reseller. On October 9, 2026, Ledger began investigating fund losses among customers who had bought from CryptoBilis. On October 10, Ledger Support said one affected user's device "contained an unauthorized hardware implant," CoinDesk reported. On October 13, Ledger explained on X that the implant decoded the 24-word recovery phrase shown during setup and sent it out over LTE using an eSIM, without modifying the Secure Element or the operating system.

Ledger has not confirmed the total stolen. On-chain researchers estimated losses of $86 million to $93 million across more than 300 wallets, and Tether froze $10 million in USDT tied to the theft, according to CoinDesk. In an October 15 blog post, Ledger described a "highly organized criminal group" that bought genuine devices, fitted hidden components and put them back into distribution through resellers in Southeast Asia. Ledger asked authorized resellers and distributors to suspend sales in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong and introduced new handling rules, such as keeping stock off shelves and never reselling returned devices.

The Trezor case differs in one important way so far: no Trezor user has reported a loss. The customer who first reported the Trezor implant had already moved his funds off the device before finding it, Trezor said in October.

Why supply-chain attacks matter

Hardware wallets are designed to keep private keys away from internet-connected computers. A supply-chain attack goes around that protection rather than through it. If someone can open a genuine device before it reaches the buyer, they do not need to break the secure chip; they only need to see the recovery phrase once.

That is also why a device's built-in checks may not help. BleepingComputer reported on October 12 that Ledger's Genuine Check cannot detect added implants when the original Secure Element is intact. Trezor's implant similarly left the firmware and Secure Element unchanged.

The response from both companies has focused on the distribution chain. Trezor says the resellers it removed "were trustworthy and posed no immediate threat," but did not fit much stricter rules that every remaining reseller must now follow, covering how devices are sourced, stored and who has access to them. Security incidents elsewhere in the industry, such as Keplr pausing Google and Apple login after a Web3Auth key breach and the Unocoin security incident involving outgoing ETH wallet transfers, show the same lesson from different angles: the weakest link is often outside the core cryptography.

How to check a device and buy safely

Trezor's official guidance here is short and clear:

  • Buy directly. For your next Trezor, the company recommends buying directly from trezor.io.

  • Do not rely on home inspection. Trezor says weighing a device is not a reliable test and that "there's no dependable way to inspect a device yourself." The person who reported the first implant noticed a weight difference, but small differences can have other causes.

  • Report, don't experiment. If you think your device may have been tampered with, contact Trezor Support, keep the device and do not set it up or use it until Trezor tells you what to do. Security researchers can email [email protected].

Has CryptoBilis responded?

CryptoBilis posted two management notices dated October 10, 2026 on its X account (published late on October 9 UTC). According to Cointelegraph, it said it had suspended sales and shipments of all hardware wallet brands in Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia, temporarily closed its physical stores and was reviewing its processes with independent specialists. We found no public response from CryptoBilis to Trezor's November 12 findings. Its X account showed no new posts after the October notices at the time of writing.

What to watch next

Trezor says it is working with SEAL 911, the Security Alliance's emergency response service, and will add dated updates to the top of its post and to its thread on X if:

  • an implant is confirmed in a device not bought from CryptoBilis, or in a model other than the Safe 5;

  • any loss of funds is linked to these implants;

  • new device protections are released.

Trezor also says the customer who first reported the implant will be rewarded for helping the investigation.

FAQ

Does firmware 2.13.1 make my CryptoBilis Safe 5 safe again?

Not on its own. Trezor says the update stops the implants it has found from capturing anything on devices that run it, but it cannot protect a wallet backup that was captured earlier. CryptoBilis buyers should still move funds to a new wallet with a new seed.

I bought my Trezor from another store. Should I worry?

Trezor says it has no confirmed cases outside CryptoBilis and found no tampering in devices from its other resellers in the region. If you are not sure where your device came from, contact Trezor Support.

Can I open or weigh my device to check it?

Trezor advises against relying on this. It says weighing is not reliable and there is no dependable way to inspect a device yourself.

Has anyone lost money from the Trezor implants?

Not according to Trezor. As of its November 12 update, no customer has reported losing funds.

Timeline note: Trezor received the first report on October 28, 2026, published its first notice on October 30, released firmware 2.13.1 on November 11 and published its findings on November 12. This article was written on November 13, 2026 (Tehran time) and is based on statements by Trezor, Ledger and the outlets cited. It is not investment advice.

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Trezor Safe 5 Implant in CryptoBilis Wallets: What to Do