Optimizely Supply-Chain Attack Served Crypto-Address Swapper to 178 Organisations' Websites, Including Ledger
On Nov. 16, attackers injected code into Optimizely Web Experimentation projects, serving a crypto-address swapper, card skimmer and iOS exploit kits to visitors of at least 178 organisations, including Ledger, IG and OANDA/Coinpass, per Report URI. Attacker wallets received about $6,600–$7,000. Optimizely says the flaw is fixed and the code removed.

Table of Contents
Malicious code injected into Optimizely Web Experimentation projects on Nov. 16, 2026 served a cryptocurrency address swapper, a payment card skimmer and iPhone exploit kits to visitors of at least 178 organisations, including hardware wallet maker Ledger, according to security researcher Scott Helme of Report URI. Optimizely says the vulnerable path has been blocked and the injected code removed. Wallets linked to the attacker received roughly $6,600 to $7,000 in crypto, according to two separate on-chain reviews.
The incident matters to crypto users because the malicious script did not need to break into any exchange or wallet provider. It rode inside a trusted third-party script that big websites already load on every page, and it rewrote wallet addresses in the browser, including addresses copied to the clipboard.
What happened
Optimizely Web Experimentation is an A/B testing tool. Each customer site loads a JavaScript file, called a snippet, from Optimizely's content delivery network at cdn.optimizely.com. That snippet carries Optimizely's own code, the customer's experiments and an optional field called Project JavaScript, custom code that the customer writes in the Optimizely dashboard and that runs on every page.
According to Report URI's write-up, published at 22:47 UTC on Nov. 16 (02:17 Tehran time on Nov. 17), the attacker wrote a short loader into the Project JavaScript of many customer projects and left the rest of each snippet untouched. The file was still delivered from Optimizely's legitimate domain with a valid certificate. The loader pulled a second script, track.js, from the domain 1688360[.]cc. Some copies hid that address in Base64, and others carried a full inline copy of the payload as a fallback if the domain was blocked.
Report URI said it fetched 1,611 distinct Optimizely snippets and found malicious code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organisations. Names on its list include Zoom, the BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM and Peacock. The company said the real number is "likely higher" because it could only check snippets it found in time. Optimizely's own sites, including login.optimizely.com, also carried the code.
Crypto and trading sites on the list
Report URI grouped six organisations under "Crypto & Trading": Ledger (ledger.com), IG, OANDA / Coinpass, interactive investor, TMS Brokers and Betashares. Thirty-two more were banks and other financial firms. According to Report URI's timeline, Ledger's snippet was cleaned at about 20:41 UTC on Nov. 16 (00:11 Tehran time on Nov. 17).
Cointelegraph reported that it had contacted Ledger, Coinpass and other affected businesses. As of about 06:05 Tehran time on Nov. 17, we found no statement about the incident on Ledger's official X account. Being on the list means the snippet loaded on that company's site carried the malicious code for a period on Nov. 16. It does not by itself show that any specific user lost funds there.
What the payload did
Report URI, StepSecurity and BleepingComputer each analysed copies of track.js. Their findings line up on four functions, which were all active at once:
Crypto address swapping. The script searched for valid addresses on Bitcoin, Ethereum and other EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin. It checked their checksums, so the replacement address was also valid and a wallet would accept it. It then replaced them with attacker addresses in page text, form fields, links, the clipboard, the share sheet and outgoing web requests. StepSecurity said it only swapped an address when nearby text contained a payment word such as "wallet", "deposit" or "send."
Card skimming. Added at 13:43 UTC (17:13 Tehran), according to Report URI. It captured card numbers, expiry dates and security codes typed into a site's own forms. Card fields inside hosted payment frames such as Stripe or Adyen were out of reach.
Cookie and screenshot theft. When it swapped an address next to payment wording, it sent the page URL, readable cookies, the original addresses and a rendered screenshot of the page to the attacker's server.
iOS exploit kits. On iPhones and iPads it loaded routers serving the Coruna kit (iOS 13 to 17) and DarkSword (iOS 18.x) in a hidden frame. Report URI said the kit's own comments mark iOS 18.7.3 and later, and iOS 26.3 and later, as patched. Public reports so far document delivery of the kits, not a confirmed compromise of a specific device.
Report URI said the attacker rebuilt track.js 26 times during the day, adding features and wallets.
How much crypto was taken
Report URI said the attacker's wallets had received about $7,040 as of 19:25 UTC on Nov. 16. Most of it, 0.08298 BTC or about $5,380, sat in a single Bitcoin address. The rest was in Litecoin, TRON (USDT and TRX), Ethereum and BNB Smart Chain. StepSecurity, working from public block explorers and Nov. 16 CoinGecko prices, put the total received or held at about $6,600. It noted that the Ethereum and TRON addresses had activity from before the campaign, so not everything in them necessarily came from victims. Four of the eight attacker addresses, on TON, Solana, Bitcoin Cash and Dogecoin, had received nothing.
We checked the Bitcoin address (19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW) on mempool.space at 02:37 UTC on Nov. 17 (06:07 Tehran). It showed five confirmed incoming transactions between 11:13 and 19:57 UTC on Nov. 16, totalling 0.08528782 BTC, with nothing spent. At Coinbase's BTC-USD spot price of $64,414.16 at the same moment, that is about $5,490. One transaction at 13:18 UTC accounted for 0.07607213 BTC. Report URI separately said funds on other chains were swept out at 13:03 to 13:05 UTC, part of it to a deposit address at the exchange HitBTC.
In dollar terms the theft is small next to the size of the audience. Security researchers, however, describe it as a reach problem more than a loss problem: the same script ran on some of the most-visited sites in the world for most of a day.
Optimizely's response
Optimizely opened a status-page incident titled "Web Experimentation Security Incident" at 01:02 UTC on Nov. 17 (04:32 Tehran). It said an unauthorized party "exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects." The company said it had fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code, secured affected user accounts and "put additional protections in place to prevent unauthorized code from being delivered." At 01:21 UTC (04:51 Tehran) it posted on X that it had "identified and contained" the incident and contacted customers directly.
A spokesperson told Cointelegraph that the flaw was in the Experimentation account signup flow. Optimizely said it had ended active sessions, revoked tokens, reset access for affected users, blocked the code from being delivered through Cloudflare, notified all affected customers and was still investigating. Optimizely has not publicly explained how a signup-flow flaw gave write access to so many unrelated customer projects. Before Optimizely's statement, Report URI said it had tried to reach the company through several channels and had no response at publication time.
Timeline
All times below are from Report URI unless noted. UTC is shown first and Tehran time (UTC+3:30) in brackets.
Nov. 13–16: An earlier wave by the same actor injects
webshell[.]lol/get.jsthrough Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts on other sites.Nov. 16, 04:21 (07:51): First Optimizely injection seen, in the BBC's snippet.
05:23 (08:53): The payload domain 1688360[.]cc is registered.
08:28 (11:58):
track.jsfirst seen loading on bbc.com.13:03 (16:33): The attacker sweeps stolen crypto to exchanges.
13:43 (17:13): Card skimmer added to the payload.
17:13–17:57 (20:43–21:27): Second iOS host added; Coruna frame injected for iOS 18.6 or earlier.
19:24–19:59 (22:54–23:29): Report URI's sweep finds 186 of 1,611 snippets infected.
20:10 (23:40): Helme posts on X that he is tracking "a breach of a 3rd-party JS host impacting hundreds of high value websites."
~20:40–21:10 (~00:10–00:40 Nov. 17): Mass clean-up, including Ledger at 20:41.
21:52 (01:22 Nov. 17): Only one of 188 infected snippets still carries the code.
22:47 (02:17 Nov. 17): Report URI publishes its full analysis.
Nov. 17, 01:02 (04:32): Optimizely status-page incident (per Optimizely).
Nov. 17, 01:21 (04:51): Optimizely's X statement.
Why a hardware wallet alone is not enough
This attack does not touch private keys. It changes the destination. If a user copies a deposit address from an infected page and pastes it into a wallet, the address that arrives may be the attacker's, and the wallet will sign a perfectly valid transaction to it. A hardware wallet still helps, but only if the user checks the address on the device screen against a trusted source. StepSecurity's advice is to compare the address on the wallet or hardware-wallet screen with the one you meant to use, not with what you copied.
Report URI also tested the Content Security Policy (CSP) of 256 hosts run by affected organisations. Sixty-eight had no CSP. Fifty allowed both the payload and the data theft. Seventeen blocked data theft but not address swapping, which happens inside the page. Only 24, or 15%, blocked the payload. Allowing cdn.optimizely.com did nothing, because the malicious code came from that trusted host. Settings such as 'unsafe-eval', which Optimizely's documentation tells customers to allow, let the inline fallback run even where track.js itself was blocked. Report URI said this is what happened at HSBC.
What users and crypto businesses can do
If you visited an affected site on Nov. 16:
Review any crypto transfer you made that day. If the receiving address does not match the one you intended, it may have been swapped.
Update iPhones and iPads to iOS 18.7.3 or later, or iOS 26.3 or later, as Report URI recommends.
Watch card statements if you paid by card on an affected site.
For future transfers, use saved address books or withdrawal whitelists, verify the full address on the device screen and consider a small test transaction for large amounts.
If you run a site that uses Optimizely Web, Report URI advises checking every project's Project JavaScript and experiment code for 1688360.cc, atob( or any script you did not write. It also advises reviewing who has write access, rotating credentials and API tokens, treating cards typed into your own forms on Nov. 16 and secrets in non-HttpOnly cookies as exposed, and deploying a restrictive CSP with reporting. Exchanges and wallet providers that display deposit addresses on web pages are a natural target for this kind of clipper.
What to watch
A fuller root-cause explanation from Optimizely, including how many customer projects were changed and over what period.
Statements from Ledger, OANDA / Coinpass, IG and other financial sites about whether customers were affected and whether they plan to notify them.
Movements from the attacker's Bitcoin address, which was unspent at our check, and any exchange freezes linked to the HitBTC deposit.
Whether the same actor's earlier wave through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media reached more crypto-related sites.
Glossary
Supply-chain attack: An attack that compromises a trusted supplier, here a third-party script provider, to reach that supplier's customers.
Clipper: Malware that replaces a copied crypto address with one controlled by the attacker.
Snippet: The JavaScript file a website loads from a vendor so the vendor's service can run in the visitor's browser.
Content Security Policy (CSP): A browser rule set that tells a page which sources it may load scripts from and send data to.
Skimmer: Code that copies payment card details as they are typed into a web form.
FAQ
Were Ledger devices or seed phrases compromised?
No report says so. The malicious code ran in web browsers on infected sites. It targeted addresses on the page and in the clipboard, card details typed into forms, readable cookies and, on iOS, the device through exploit kits. Nothing published so far points to Ledger hardware, firmware or recovery phrases.
Is it still active?
Report URI found the code in only one of 188 infected snippets at 21:52 UTC on Nov. 16. Optimizely says it has removed the code and blocked the vulnerable path. The attacker domains listed by Report URI should still be blocked and treated as hostile.
I made a transfer on Nov. 16. How do I check?
Compare the destination in your transaction history with the address you intended to pay. A match with one of the attacker addresses published by Report URI is a clear sign of a swap.
This article is news reporting, not investment or security advice. Figures are attributed to their sources and may change as investigations continue.
Related reading
Across Protocol domain hijack: another front-end attack on crypto users
Trezor shipping partner Skladon breached, exposing data from about 27,000 orders
Sources
Report URI (Scott Helme): "World's Largest Brands Infected With Malware Via Optimizely", Nov. 16, 2026, 22:47 UTC
Optimizely status page: "Web Experimentation Security Incident", Nov. 17, 2026, 01:02 UTC
Optimizely on X, Nov. 17, 2026, 01:21 UTC
Scott Helme on X (first alert), Nov. 16, 2026, 20:10 UTC; follow-up, 22:57 UTC
StepSecurity: "OPTIMJACK: Optimizely-Hosted Scripts Loaded a Crypto Clipper and Card Skimmer", Nov. 17, 2026
BleepingComputer: "Optimizely supply chain attack infects major brands' sites with malware", Nov. 17, 2026, 02:12 UTC
Cointelegraph: "Ledger, BBC Among 178 Organizations Hit by Crypto Malware", Nov. 17, 2026, 01:02 UTC
mempool.space: attacker Bitcoin address, checked Nov. 17, 2026, 02:37 UTC
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