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MANTRA Pauses OM Unbonding for 7 Days as Keplr–Web3Auth Key Exploit Hits Staked Tokens

MANTRA paused all new unbonding on its network for seven days on November 13, 2026, after attackers holding private keys exposed in the Web3Auth–Keplr incident began unstaking victims' OM without consent. Unbondings already in progress are not frozen, so affected users must redelegate within the 8-day window. Web3Auth says logins have resumed, but a return process for recovered funds has not been published yet.

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Padlock and chain (file photo), illustrating MANTRA's unbonding pause. Photo: Dori, CC BY 2.5, via Wikimedia Commons
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MANTRA, the layer-1 blockchain behind the OM token, has paused all new unbonding transactions on its network for seven days after attackers who obtained private keys through the Web3Auth–Keplr incident began unstaking victims' tokens without their consent. The chain had already frozen several attacker-linked wallets through an expedited governance upgrade, while Web3Auth says logins have resumed and a process to return recovered funds is still being prepared.

The pause is an unusual step for a proof-of-stake network: it changes how every staker on the chain can exit, not just the victims. MANTRA says it acted to stop "further damage" from what it calls an "upstream exploit." This article separates what the companies have confirmed from what remains unclear. Times are in UTC, with Tehran time (UTC+3:30) in brackets.

What MANTRA announced

In a post on X published on November 13, 2026 at 10:28 UTC (13:58 Tehran), MANTRA said it had received "numerous complaints from the community about the hackers unbonding their staked MANTRA tokens without their consent," adding that this came "after any liquid MANTRA tokens have already been stolen."

The key points of the announcement are:

  • Seven-day emergency pause. MANTRA is "putting through an emergency pause on all unbonding transactions for 7 days." It said it will review the measure after seven days and "reserve[s] the right to make further pauses."

  • Unbondings already under way are not frozen. The pause "does NOT freeze unbondings which are already in progress." Affected users must redelegate before the network's 8-day unbonding period completes, to stop attackers from claiming the tokens and moving them to an address the user doesn't control.

  • Redelegated tokens stay locked. Once a user has redelegated, any later unbonding request is paused until MANTRA ends the freeze.

  • Attacker wallets frozen. MANTRA said that, "as you have seen in Gov Prop 41," it had already frozen "several of the hackers' wallets" while supporting Web3Auth and Keplr in recovery efforts.

The post included an on-chain transaction hash for the change. MANTRA said it does not "take this action lightly" but believes it is in the community's best interest.

Crypto Briefing reported the pause the same day, confirming the same terms. Counting from November 13, the seven-day review would fall around November 20; MANTRA has not given an exact time.

What is unbonding, and why attackers target it

On Cosmos-based proof-of-stake chains such as MANTRA, holders "delegate" (stake) tokens to validators to earn rewards. To get staked tokens back as freely transferable coins, a holder must "unbond" them. Unbonding takes a fixed period, which MANTRA puts at 8 days, and only after it ends do the tokens become liquid.

That waiting period normally protects networks. Here it became a race. An attacker with a victim's private key can sign transactions exactly like the owner, including an unbonding request. When the period ends, the tokens become liquid in the victim's address, where the attacker can move them at once.

Redelegation moves stake from one validator to another without leaving the staked state. MANTRA's advice relies on this: the owner can cancel the attacker's path to liquid tokens by redelegating first. The catch is that the attacker holds the same key, so anyone whose key was exposed should treat that address as permanently compromised.

Governance Proposal 41: a security upgrade with extra restrictions

MANTRA's governance records, as shown on the MoonRunners explorer, list Proposal 41 as an expedited software upgrade, "v8.8.0 MAINNET MANTRA Chain Upgrade," submitted on November 9 and passed on November 10, 2026 with 100% of votes cast in favor.

The proposal text describes a mandatory, consensus-breaking security release. It moves the chain's cosmos/evm module to a patched version fixing four published GitHub security advisories and rebuilds the binary with Go 1.26. It adds one line relevant here: "Some additional restrictions are also added due to Keplr Wallet exploit due to flaw in Web3Auth." The proposal text itself does not list wallet addresses.

Third-party trackers have published addresses they say were frozen. The incident archive 0xCERT, in an advisory dated November 13 and updated November 14, lists three MANTRA addresses as "hacker" wallets frozen by Proposal 41. One of those three matches an address that Web3Auth itself published on X on November 9 as a verified recovery wallet for the MANTRA network. MyTraderBot could not determine which label is correct, and MANTRA has not published its own list in the sources we reviewed. Readers should not send funds to, or interact with, any address based on third-party lists.

Background: the Web3Auth–Keplr key exposure

The root incident began a week earlier. On November 6 at 21:13 UTC (November 7, 00:43 Tehran), Web3Auth, the Consensys-owned login service, said it was aware of a security issue affecting services used by some third parties. Keplr, a widely used Cosmos wallet, said on November 7 at 04:38 UTC (08:08 Tehran) that some accounts created with Google or Apple login showed unauthorized transactions. MyTraderBot covered those first days in our earlier report on Keplr's paused social login.

Users who created Keplr wallets with a recovery phrase or a hardware wallet were not affected, according to Keplr. Keplr co-founder Josh Lee estimated, as reported by The Block on November 8, that about 20% of Keplr's Google and Apple login accounts were affected. The Block also found that the 12 recovery addresses Web3Auth had published then held about $5.6 million in crypto.

Web3Auth's latest update: logins back, refunds not yet

On November 13, Web3Auth published a consolidated incident update, announced on X at 15:29 UTC (18:59 Tehran). It says:

  • On November 7 it confirmed "a security issue in Web3Auth infrastructure affecting certain embedded wallets," which led to unauthorized access to some accounts created with Google or Apple login. The incident affected Torus Wallet and embedded wallets used by third-party apps such as Keplr.

  • It ran "white-hat recovery operations" with Keplr, moving assets believed to be at immediate risk into recovery wallets. These operations "remain ongoing."

  • Recovered funds are being held while it works with Keplr on returning them, and it expects to share "further details on the return process in the coming days." No return date or loss total was given.

  • Logins and wallet access have resumed for existing users. Web3Auth SDK versions 9 and older are deprecated, and developers should move to v10 or v11.

  • For Single Factor Auth (SFA) apps, new user registrations remain restricted. On legacy networks, Web3Auth says it will enable new registrations by November 23, 2026 for developers who migrate.

A developer thread on November 12 at 18:46 UTC (22:16 Tehran) added that new logins on legacy networks named Legacy Mainnet, Aqua, Celeste and Cyan were paused, that Sapphire networks worked normally, and that new custom connections on its dashboard were halted.

Timeline

  • Nov 6, 21:13 UTC (Nov 7, 00:43 Tehran): Web3Auth reports a security issue and pauses its embedded wallet service.

  • Nov 7, 04:38 UTC (08:08 Tehran): Keplr reports unauthorized transactions on some Google/Apple login accounts.

  • Nov 8: Web3Auth publishes verified recovery addresses; The Block counts about $5.6 million in them.

  • Nov 9–10: MANTRA Proposal 41 (v8.8.0 upgrade, with Keplr-related restrictions) is submitted and passes.

  • Nov 12, 18:46 UTC (22:16 Tehran): Web3Auth says logins resume for existing users and deprecates legacy SDKs.

  • Nov 13, 10:28 UTC (13:58 Tehran): MANTRA announces a seven-day pause on new unbonding.

  • Nov 13: Web3Auth publishes its consolidated update; return process still pending.

  • Around Nov 20: MANTRA's stated seven-day review (our calculation).

  • By Nov 23: Web3Auth's target for new registrations on legacy networks.

Why it matters for users and the market

Embedded wallets carry provider risk. Social-login wallets remove the need to write down a seed phrase, but they add a dependency on the provider's key infrastructure. This incident shows that a flaw in one provider can expose users of many apps at once. Our guide to storing a recovery phrase safely explains the trade-off.

Chain-level intervention cuts both ways. Freezing wallets through a software upgrade and pausing unbonding for everyone can protect victims, but it also shows that a small validator set and core team can restrict transfers quickly. Holders who value censorship resistance will weigh that against the protection it offered here. Every OM staker who wanted to exit for unrelated reasons is now waiting too.

Other Cosmos chains may face the same pattern. Web3Auth's recovery lists covered many networks. Any proof-of-stake chain where victims had staked tokens could see the same "unbond and wait" attack, so users of other Cosmos chains should check their stake as well.

What affected users should do

  • If your wallet was created with Google or Apple login through Keplr, check for unbonding you did not start. If you see one, MANTRA's guidance is to redelegate before the 8-day period ends.

  • Treat any exposed key as compromised. Move what you can to a new wallet created with a fresh recovery phrase or a hardware wallet.

  • Follow only official Web3Auth, Keplr and MANTRA channels. Web3Auth warns it will never ask for seed phrases, private keys or passwords in direct messages. Ignore "refund" or "claim" links.

  • Review dApp permissions after any wallet scare; our token approvals guide shows how.

What to watch next

  • Whether MANTRA lifts, extends or modifies the unbonding pause after its seven-day review.

  • Web3Auth and Keplr's return process for recovered funds, and whether they publish a total loss figure and root-cause report.

  • Whether MANTRA publishes its own list of frozen addresses and explains how frozen funds will be handled.

  • Whether other Cosmos chains adopt similar emergency measures.

For other recent incidents, see our reports on the Proxima log key leak and the Kava Lend exploit.

FAQ

Are all MANTRA stakers affected by the pause?

Yes, in the sense that new unbonding requests are paused network-wide for seven days. Only wallets whose keys were exposed have had funds stolen, according to MANTRA.

Are Keplr users with a seed phrase at risk?

Keplr says wallets created with a recovery phrase or a hardware wallet were not affected. The exposure concerned Google and Apple login accounts.

When will recovered funds be returned?

Web3Auth has not given a date. It says details of the return process will follow "in the coming days."

This article is news reporting, not investment advice. Sources: MANTRA (X, Nov. 13, 2026), Web3Auth incident update (Nov. 13, 2026) and X posts, MANTRA governance records via MoonRunners, The Block (Nov. 8), Crypto Briefing (Nov. 13), 0xCERT (Nov. 13–14).

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MANTRA Pauses OM Unbonding After Keplr–Web3Auth Exploit