Proxima Refunds 181 Users After Private Keys Leaked Through Its Monitoring Logs and 5,324 SOL Was Drained
An attacker drained 5,324.2 SOL from 870 Solana wallets belonging to 181 users of token-launch platform Proxima on November 14, 2026. The company's post-mortem says debug logs had recorded private keys, its outdated self-hosted SigNoz monitoring instance had a publicly disclosed vulnerability, and a firewall rule had been removed by accident. Proxima says it refunded all affected users from its treasury, replaced exposed wallets and added new safeguards. SigNoz has not commented publicly.

Table of Contents
An attacker drained 5,324.2 SOL from 870 Solana wallets belonging to 181 users of Proxima, a token-launch and trading infrastructure platform, on November 14, 2026, after private keys ended up in the company's own monitoring logs. Proxima says it has refunded every affected user from its treasury and brought the platform back online.
The company's post-mortem, published late on November 14, changes the picture painted by its first statements. Early updates said the breach "originated from SigNoz," the third-party monitoring tool Proxima uses. The final report says the problem was a mix of Proxima's own mistakes: debug logs that recorded private keys, an outdated self-hosted SigNoz instance with a publicly disclosed vulnerability, and a firewall rule that had been removed by accident.
All times below are in UTC, with Tehran time (UTC+3:30) in brackets.
What happened, according to Proxima
Proxima describes itself on X as "the premium all-in-one infrastructure layer for token lifecycle management." It creates and manages wallets for users, including funding wallets and "fresh" and "aged" wallets used around token launches, and runs automated sessions such as auto-buy, auto-sell, market-making and volume sessions. Because the platform generates these wallets, its servers can access their private keys.
The post-mortem gives this account:
Between November 3 and November 10 at 13:20 UTC (16:50 Tehran), a debug-level log statement added during work on private-beta features wrote private key material into internal diagnostic logs. It was never meant to run in production, but it did when the team lowered the production log level from "info" to "debug" to monitor performance.
The logging was switched off on November 10, but the logs were kept under a 15-day retention policy. They were still stored in Proxima's SigNoz instance on November 14.
That instance had been set up months earlier by an external consultant and had not been upgraded "due to dependency constraints." Proxima says the version it ran had "a publicly disclosed vulnerability that allowed unauthenticated access to stored data."
A Cloudflare Web Application Firewall (WAF) rule meant to block public access to the instance "was inadvertently removed," so the tool could be reached from the internet.
Proxima says the attacker's access was limited to the monitoring tool and that its main databases and core systems were not directly breached. The keys found in the logs were enough to empty wallets, though.
Timeline of November 14
02:16 UTC (05:46 Tehran): The attacker starts extracting stored logs. Most of the extraction happens after 03:00 UTC and ends around 05:30 UTC (09:00 Tehran).
03:22 UTC (06:52 Tehran): First confirmed unauthorized wallet drain.
About 04:45 UTC (08:15 Tehran): Proxima receives its first incident alerts.
05:23 UTC (08:53 Tehran): The team starts emergency migration of funds out of exposed wallets while the attack is still going on.
05:42 UTC (09:12 Tehran): Last confirmed unauthorized drain.
06:48 UTC (10:18 Tehran): Co-founder Theo (@0xTheo__) posts the first public statement, citing "a security vulnerability affecting SigNoz" and "approximately $200-250k in affected funds (less than 5% of total funds)," and promises full reimbursement.
12:24 UTC (15:54 Tehran): A second update says the breach "originated from SigNoz," that "other protocols have also been impacted to varying degrees," and that wallets created, imported or exported in the previous 15 days may be compromised.
22:16 UTC (01:46 Tehran, November 15): Proxima publishes its post-mortem and says all 181 affected users have been refunded.
The numbers
Proxima's confirmed figures are 5,324.2 SOL stolen, 870 affected Solana addresses (which it says is about 0.1% of Proxima wallets) and 181 affected users. It says no token holdings and no funds on EVM chains were stolen.
The post-mortem does not put a dollar value on the loss. Solana traded at roughly $75 to $76 during the attack window, according to CoinGecko's five-minute price data for 03:20 to 05:40 UTC on November 14. At that price, 5,324.2 SOL was worth roughly $400,000. That is well above the "$200-250k" estimate Theo gave in his first post. It is not clear whether the early number was based on an incomplete count.
Is SigNoz to blame?
This is the main point readers should get right. SigNoz is an open-source observability platform that companies can host themselves. Proxima's early posts suggested a breach at SigNoz affecting several protocols. The post-mortem describes something narrower: Proxima's own instance, running an older version, was exposed to the internet and exploited through a known bug.
SigNoz's public GitHub security advisories include several fixes published in September and October 2026. One of them, CVE-2026-97055 (published by the U.S. National Vulnerability Database on September 24, 2026), describes how SigNoz versions from v0.8.0 to before v0.143.0 used an empty default signing secret for session tokens. That let an unauthenticated attacker forge a valid login, including an administrator's. Another advisory, dated September 14, covers missing authentication on trace-funnel analytics endpoints. Proxima has not said which vulnerability was used, so these are context only, not a confirmed root cause.
We found no public statement from SigNoz about the incident at the time of writing. No other affected protocol has been named, and Proxima's earlier claim that "other protocols" were hit has not been independently confirmed.
Independent checks
The incident itself is not in doubt. Users began reporting drained wallets on X early on November 14, and the security incident tracker The Weather Report logged it the same day. An on-chain review published on OKX's Orbit platform followed one affected wallet. The review found that it sent out about 0.258 SOL at 03:32 UTC and a large token balance at 05:34 UTC. Both transfers fall inside the attack window Proxima later gave, and the second is consistent with the company's cleanup of token positions. The total stolen and the full refund of every user are Proxima's own figures. We have not seen a public list of refund transactions.
What Proxima has changed
According to the post-mortem, Proxima has:
Patched the monitoring tool and removed public access to it.
Stopped writing sensitive data into diagnostic logs.
Invalidated all user sessions and rotated infrastructure credentials.
Disabled exposed license keys.
Required two-factor authentication for private key exports.
Migrated the affected infrastructure.
Every exposed wallet has been replaced by a new wallet with a fresh key inside the same account. Old wallets are labeled "Compromised" or "Possibly exposed" and kept in separate folders. Automated sessions were paused and must be restarted by users with the new wallets. A few very large token positions were left in their original wallets "to avoid disrupting their markets" and will be handled one by one.
What this means for users
Analysis: The incident shows a risk that is easy to miss with custodial or semi-custodial trading tools. When a platform can sign for your wallet, its whole software stack becomes part of your wallet's security. That includes logging, monitoring and third-party services. The same lesson came up earlier this month when the Keplr and Web3Auth login incident exposed keys through a provider rather than the wallet app itself.
Practical points, in line with Proxima's own advice:
Stop using exposed wallets for good. A leaked key cannot be "fixed." If you imported a Proxima-labeled wallet into another app, treat it as compromised there too.
Do not send funds to old addresses. Deposits to a wallet whose key is public can be taken at any time.
Review automations before restarting them. Bots that point to old wallets can keep sending funds there. Our guide to how crypto trading bots work and their risks covers the custody trade-offs.
Keep long-term holdings in self-custody. Use keys you created yourself, and store your recovery phrase offline as explained in our seed phrase safety guide.
Ignore "recovery" DMs. Scammers often target victims after a hack. Proxima said users did not need to contact it individually.
Key terms
Observability/monitoring tool: Software that collects logs, metrics and traces so engineers can see how systems behave. It often holds sensitive data.
Debug logging: A very detailed logging level used during development. It can capture data that should never be stored.
WAF (Web Application Firewall): A filter that blocks unwanted traffic to web services.
Private key: The secret that authorizes transactions from a wallet. Anyone holding it controls the funds.
What to watch
Whether Proxima publishes refund transaction details or a list of affected addresses for independent checking.
Whether SigNoz comments, and whether any other protocol confirms it was affected.
How the large token positions left in original wallets are handled.
Whether other crypto platforms audit their logging and monitoring setups after this incident.
FAQ
Were Proxima users' tokens or EVM funds stolen?
Proxima says no. Only SOL balances in Solana wallets were drained.
Which wallets were exposed?
Wallets whose private keys appeared in diagnostic logs between November 3 and November 10 at 13:20 UTC, including older wallets used during that period. Proxima says wallets created after that time were not affected by this exposure.
Was SigNoz itself hacked?
Proxima's post-mortem describes an exploit of its own outdated, publicly reachable SigNoz instance through a publicly disclosed vulnerability. It does not describe a breach of SigNoz's company systems.
Sources
Proxima, "Proxima Security Incident - Post-Mortem & Full Reimbursement of Affected Users," X article shared by co-founder Theo, November 14, 2026, 22:16 UTC: x.com/0xTheo__/status/2121728996631269792
Theo (@0xTheo__), first statement, November 14, 2026, 06:48 UTC: x.com/0xTheo__/status/2121495544203755809
Theo (@0xTheo__), update, November 14, 2026, 12:24 UTC: x.com/0xTheo__/status/2121579940671844400
NVD, CVE-2026-97055, published September 24, 2026: nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97055
SigNoz GitHub security advisories (GHSA-c26w-g4j8-39m2, September 23, 2026; GHSA-v549-7j2x-qjm5, September 14, 2026): github.com/SigNoz/signoz/security/advisories
The Weather Report, incident entry, November 14, 2026: theweatherreport.ai/incidents/2026-11-14-proxima
OKX Orbit, on-chain review of the Proxima incident (Chinese), November 14, 2026: okx.com/orbit/insight/92758560129472
CoinGecko, SOL/USD five-minute price data, November 14, 2026, 03:20 to 05:40 UTC: coingecko.com/en/coins/solana
This article is for information only and is not investment advice.
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