Bitcoin Core Discloses Three Patched Vulnerabilities, Including a High-Severity Mining Bug
Bitcoin Core has published details of three vulnerabilities fixed in October 2025, including a high-severity bug that could stop mining nodes from building valid block templates after a reorg. No theft or exploitation is reported; versions 29.x and older are now end of life.

Table of Contents
Summary: The Bitcoin Core project has published details of three security vulnerabilities that were fixed quietly more than a year ago. One is rated High severity and could stop an affected mining node from producing valid block templates after a chain reorganization. The other two are rated Medium: one let a malicious peer stall block processing, and one gave incoming Tor connections trusted "whitelist" permissions on nodes with a common but non-default setup. All three were fixed in Bitcoin Core 30.0, 29.2 and 28.3 in October 2025, and every affected release line is now end of life. There is no report in the advisories of the bugs being exploited, and none of them allowed coins to be stolen.
Event dates: the three advisories are dated November 10, 2026 on bitcoincore.org (no publication time given). The Block reported the disclosure on November 11, 2026 at 07:50 EST (12:50 UTC, 16:20 Tehran time, UTC+3:30).
What was disclosed
Bitcoin Core is the reference software that most Bitcoin full nodes run. It checks every block and transaction against the network's rules, keeps a local pool of unconfirmed transactions (the "mempool"), and, for miners, assembles the candidate blocks they try to mine. On November 10, 2026, the project added three entries to its security advisories page:
CVE-2025-62861 (High): block template creation halted by TRUC "sibling eviction" during a reorg.
CVE-2025-62859 (Medium): block processing stall via witness malleation in compact blocks.
CVE-2025-62860 (Medium): inbound Tor connections wrongly receiving
-whitelistpermissions.
The timing is not a sign of a new emergency. Under the project's published policy, details of Medium and High severity bugs are released two weeks after the last affected release goes end of life. The advisories state that the last vulnerable version line, 29.x, reached end of life on October 27, 2026. Disclosure followed on November 10.
The High severity bug: miners stuck after a reorg
What TRUC and sibling eviction are
TRUC stands for "Topologically Restricted Until Confirmation". It is a relay policy for version 3 transactions, described in BIP 431, that limits how unconfirmed transactions can be chained together: a TRUC transaction may have at most one unconfirmed parent and at most one unconfirmed child. These limits help fee-bumping work more predictably, which matters for Layer 2 systems such as the Lightning Network.
Bitcoin Core 28.0 added "sibling eviction". If a new transaction would give a TRUC parent a second unconfirmed child, the node can treat the existing child as something to replace and evict it, provided the newcomer pays enough under replace-by-fee rules.
The key point is that these are mempool policy rules, not consensus rules. A valid block can legitimately contain a TRUC parent with several children; the node just would not have built that shape in its own mempool.
Where it went wrong
In a chain reorganization ("reorg"), a node switches from one chain tip to a competing, heavier one. Transactions from the blocks that were dropped go back into the mempool. The advisory explains that this re-adding is supposed to bypass normal anti-denial-of-service and topology limits so that previously confirmed transactions are restored faithfully.
The bug was that sibling eviction was not switched off during that step. A reorg could restore a TRUC parent with more than one child, and the eviction logic could then remove one restored transaction while leaving its descendants in the mempool. According to the advisory, the mempool "held transactions spending outputs that no longer existed."
Why it mattered
For an ordinary node the effect was limited. For a miner it was serious: block templates built from the inconsistent mempool failed their validity check, so "a node that performed such a reorg cannot produce blocks until it is restarted." Restarting reloads the mempool in a consistent state. Small reorgs happen naturally on Bitcoin from time to time, which is why the project rated the issue High.
The affected versions were 28.0 to 28.2 and 29.0 to 29.1. Niklas Goegge reported the bug on September 26, 2025. Greg Sanders opened the fix (pull request #33504) on September 29, it was merged on October 2, and it was backported to the 28.x, 29.x and 30.x branches.
Medium bug 1: stalling block processing with a malleated witness
Nodes use "compact blocks" to spread new blocks quickly: instead of sending a full block, a peer sends a short summary and the receiving node rebuilds the block from transactions it already holds. The "witness" is the part of a SegWit transaction that carries signatures. "Witness malleation" means altering that data in a way that does not change the transaction ID.
The advisory says affected versions cleared their download state for a compact block after rebuilding it but before checking for a malleated witness. If the check failed, the node asked the same peer for the full block, with a 10-minute timeout. A malicious peer that announced the block first could use this to delay the victim's block processing. If the attacker controlled all three of the victim's high-bandwidth peers, or the node ran in -blocksonly mode, the stall "could be repeated indefinitely."
Eugene Siegel reported the issue on April 28, 2025. Gregory Sanders opened the fix (PR #32646) on May 30, it was merged on June 30 and backported to version 29 in September 2025. Versions before 29.2 and 30.0 were affected.
Medium bug 2: Tor peers treated as trusted
Bitcoin Core's -whitelist option marks certain peers as trusted and lifts various denial-of-service limits and privacy-leak mitigations for them. It is off by default.
When a node accepts connections through Tor, every inbound Tor peer appears to come from the IP address of the local Tor daemon. If an operator whitelisted an IP range that included the Tor daemon's address, Bitcoin Core also whitelisted every incoming Tor peer, including strangers.
The advisory explains why this was widespread: "Popular vendors bundled Bitcoin Core with a Tor daemon, and set the -whitelist option to an IP range matching that of the Tor daemon," and the option was also an operational requirement for some companion software. This led to "thousands of reachable mainnet nodes whitelisting all incoming Tor connections." The project did not name the vendors.
Martin Zumsande and Antoine Poinsot reported the issue on September 12, 2025. The fix (PR #33395) was merged and backported on September 17. That same day the issue was reported to Bitcoin Knots maintainer Luke Dashjr, and on September 19 it was shared with several affected software providers. Since Bitcoin Core 30.0, 29.2 and 28.3, inbound connections received on an onion bind are never whitelisted. Nodes that never set -whitelist were not affected.
Timeline
April 28, 2025: witness malleation stall (CVE-2025-62859) reported.
September 12, 2025: Tor whitelist issue (CVE-2025-62860) reported.
September 26, 2025: TRUC reorg bug (CVE-2025-62861) reported.
October 10, 2025: Bitcoin Core 30.0 released with all three fixes.
October 14, 2025: Bitcoin Core 29.2 released with fixes.
October 17 and 20, 2025: the advisories date Bitcoin Core 28.3 to October 17 (TRUC advisory) and October 20 (Tor advisory); the two pages give different dates.
October 27, 2026: the 29.x line goes end of life, the same day 32.x is released, per the project's lifecycle page.
November 10, 2026: public disclosure of all three advisories.
November 11, 2026: media coverage, including The Block.
How Bitcoin Core rates and discloses vulnerabilities
The project uses four severity classes. Critical covers bugs that threaten the whole network, such as coin theft at the protocol level, inflation outside the issuance schedule, or permanent chain splits. High covers bugs with significant impact that are typically remotely exploitable and can cause widespread disruption. Medium covers bugs that degrade performance or functionality but need special conditions, such as non-default settings. Low covers bugs that are hard to exploit or minor.
None of the three newly disclosed bugs is Critical. None let an attacker steal coins or break Bitcoin's supply rules.
The policy also says that easily discoverable bugs, "such as through a simple LLM prompt," are fixed and disclosed as soon as possible rather than held under the normal embargo. Two weeks before details of embargoed bugs are released, the project pre-announces how many fixed vulnerabilities there are and how severe they are, alongside a new major release.
What it means for node operators, miners and users
Node operators
Anyone on Bitcoin Core 30.0 or later, or on 29.2 or 28.3 and later minor versions, already has all three fixes. Under the lifecycle page, the maintained lines are now 32.x, 31.x and 30.x, and the project recommends "running the latest maintenance release of the most recent major version you are able to upgrade to." Operators still running 29.x or older are on unsupported software that does not generally receive security fixes.
Operators who use -whitelist alongside Tor, including through bundled node packages, should check which version their package ships and review whether the whitelist range is still needed.
Miners and pools
The High severity bug was specific to block template creation. Mining infrastructure is often updated cautiously, so pools and solo miners should confirm their template-producing nodes are on a fixed, maintained release.
Holders and traders
For people who hold or trade bitcoin on exchanges, there is no direct action. The advisories describe availability and privacy issues on individual nodes, not risks to coin ownership. This is a disclosure of old, patched issues, not a new attack. Be wary of messages that use the news to urge you to download "urgent" wallet updates from unofficial links; get software only from official project sources.
Analysis: what this says about Bitcoin's security process
The following is MyTraderBot's analysis, not a statement from the Bitcoin Core project.
The disclosure shows a slow, deliberate model: fix privately, ship the fix in normal releases, wait until unpatched lines are out of support, then publish details. The downside is that users on old versions are exposed to details once they become public. The Tor case also shows how third-party packaging decisions can spread a non-default setting to thousands of nodes, so node risk depends on both the core code and how vendors configure it.
What to watch
Whether node package vendors publish notes on their past use of
-whitelistwith Tor.How many reachable nodes are still on end-of-life versions now that details are public.
The next pre-announcement, which per policy comes with the next major release and lists the number and severity of fixed bugs awaiting disclosure.
Frequently asked questions
Were any bitcoins stolen because of these bugs?
The advisories do not report any theft or exploitation, and the bugs affected node availability and privacy rather than coin ownership.
Do I need to update right now?
If you run Bitcoin Core 30.0 or later, or 29.2 or 28.3 and later minor versions, you already have the fixes. Even so, versions 29.x and older are end of life, so updating to a maintained release is recommended.
Why were the details published a year after the fix?
Under the project's policy, Medium and High severity details come out two weeks after the last affected release goes end of life, to give users time to upgrade.
Related reading on MyTraderBot
Sources
Bitcoin Core, CVE-2025-62861 advisory, published November 10, 2026.
Bitcoin Core, CVE-2025-62859 advisory, published November 10, 2026.
Bitcoin Core, CVE-2025-62860 advisory, published November 10, 2026.
Bitcoin Core, Security advisories and disclosure policy and Software life cycle, accessed November 11, 2026.
The Block, Bitcoin Core discloses three patched security flaws, November 11, 2026, 07:50 EST.
This article is for information only and is not investment advice.
- BTCBitcoin
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